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Introduction
Human population is projected to grow at 70 million per
annum increasing by 35% to 9.1 billion by 2050 (FAO,
2009). This increased population density, coupled with
changes in dietary habits in developing countries towards
high quality food (e.g. more consumption of meat and milk
products) and the increasing use of grains for livestock feed,
is projected to cause the demand for food production to
increase by 70%. The increase in production has to happen at
the same time as the climate is changing and becoming less
predictable, as greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture
need to be cut, and as land and water resources are shrinking
or deteriorating. The provision of additional agricultural land
is limited, as it would have to happen mostly at the expense
of forests and the natural habitats of wildlife, wild relatives
of crops, and natural enemies of crop pests. Furthermore, a
higher proportion of agricultural land may be used
industrially to produce biofuel or fibre instead of food. Thus,
we may need to grow food on even less land, with less water,
using less energy, fertiliser and pesticide than we are using
today. Given these limitations, sustainable production at
elevated levels is urgently needed. Increasing productivity on
existing land is by far the better choice.
1. Food security
The food crisis in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011 caught the
world by surprise. Do we now expect a new policy paradigm
from open markets to protectionism, from food security to
self sufficiency, from imports to outsourcing (land
acquisition) and from private to public market intervention?
More recent transnational land deals are partly a
consequence of the larger changing economic valuation of
land and water. Higher agricultural prices generally result in
higher land prices because the expected returns to land
increase when profits per unit of land increase. Given that the
food price crisis has increased competition for land and water
resources for agriculture, it is not surprising that farmland
prices have risen throughout the world in recent years.
An increasing number of countries are leasing and
purchasing land abroad to sustain and secure their food
production. Food-importing countries with land and water
constraints but rich in capital are at the forefront of new
investments in farmland abroad. Some agreements do not
involve direct land acquisition, but seek to secure food
supplies through contract farming and investment in rural
and agricultural infrastructure, including irrigation systems
and roads (Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009).
These include the acquisition of 690 000 ha of land in
Sudan by South Korea, and around 320 000 ha of Pakistani
land by the UnitedArab Emirates, as well as a pending Saudi
request for 500 000 ha of Tanzanian land and Chinese
attempts to secure more than one million hectares in the
Philippines. A major evolution from past patterns is the
transition from overseas profit oriented investments for
tropical cash crops to farmland acquisition for growing basic
staples, with an eye to bolstering a country’s food security
(Table 1).
Although additional investments in agriculture in
developing countries by the private and the public sector
should be welcome in principle, the scale, the terms and the
speed of land acquisition have provoked opposition in some
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target countries (the Philippines, Madagascar). Well-
documented examples on these developments are scarce. The
lack of transparency limits the involvement of civil society in
negotiating and implementing deals and the ability of local
stakeholders to respond to new challenges and opportunities.
The main concerns today are the declining rate of food
self-sufficiency and a growing sense of the potential for
disruption to domestic food supplies in an uncertain world
(climate change, energy security, safety concerns over
imported food, geopolitical tensions and the food price spike
in 2008 and 2010). We face a future of food scarcity, with
high, albeit very volatile prices both for inputs and outputs.
Food scarcity is aggravated by managed trade and lack of
finance and eventually also by environmental degradation.
More responsibility is needed regarding food trade, and more
responsibility in cutting GHG emissions. Well-functioning
markets can help to reduce this risk. Domestic food supplies
are not less risky than imports (energy), but it is sensible to
plan for systemic risks (such as nuclear fallout, port strikes,
etc.). We experience food poverty due to a lack of
entitlements, not lack of food availability.
If there is going to be enough food at affordable prices for
the global population, we may also have to change our food
habits and decrease food waste. Globally, an average of 35%
of crop yields are lost to pre-harvest pests. In some developing
countries pre-harvest losses can go as high as 70%. The
conservation of fertile soils, the development of high-yielding
varieties and the reduction of current yield losses caused by
pests, pathogens, and weeds are major challenges to
agricultural production Whilst technology will undoubtedly
hold many of the keys to long term global food security, the
development and testing of new varieties or techniques takes
time. It may be 10 years or more before people see the
benefits. However, there is a lot we can do today with existing
knowledge. Part of the key is also to avoid waste along the
whole length of the food chain. In addition to the pre-harvest
losses (35% of crop yields) transport, pre-processing, storage,
processing, packaging, marketing and plate waste losses are
relatively high too (Figure 1). We can save also water by
reducing losses in the food chain. The insects, weeds and
microbial pests cause the most problems but research,
education and training can play a key role in helping the world
lose less after harvest along the food chain.
Helping farmers lose less of their crops will be a key
factor in promoting food security, but even in the poorest
countries those rural farmers aspire to more than self-
sufficiency. They want to improve their livelihoods so as to
buy higher quality, more nutritious food and to afford a better
standard of living, healthcare and education. So we also need
to build the knowledge and skills that will help them earn
more for their crops. In an increasingly global food system,
this is about quality as well as quantity.
World population growth is the biggest challenge: 75
million more people a year, rising to 9 billion by 2050.
Consequently, there is a rapidly growing demand for crop
products, including feed with increasing meat consumption.
Other major global trends are globalisation, urbanisation and
motorisation. With production moving to the most
competitive regions, food trade is becoming more liberalised
but also more concentrated. Growing energy demand and
climate change will also influence food production, with
agriculture contributing to emissions; agriculture will also
suffer or benefit from changing climates depending on
climatic zones. Additional challenges are increasing market
volatility, resulting from yield and end stock fluctuations and
consumer sensitivity to food quality, safety and price. There
is uncertainty regarding the timing and application of
innovations as regards biotechnology, nanotechnology,
precision farming, carbon sequestration, and information
technology. These challenges are aggravated by global
irresponsibility, regarding food and energy security, water
and environmental sustainability.
There is good potential for new land cultivation in Latin
America, Africa and Eastern Europe (Ukraine and Russia).
However, new land is insufficient, and either inappropriate
because of poor or polluted soils, or difficult to use for food
production (due to doubtful property rights and/or poor
finance and/or due to government mismanagement and lack
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Table 1. Transnational land acquisition, 2006-2009
Source: Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009)
Country investor Country Plot size (hectares)
Bahrain Philippines 10 000
China (with private
entities)
Philippines 1 240 000
Jordan Sudan 25 000
Libya Ukraine 250 000
Qatar Kenya 40 000
Saudi Arabia Tanzania 500 000
South Korea (with private
entities)
Sudan 690 000
United Arab Emirates
(with private entities)
Pakistan 324 000
Source: IWMI (2007)
Figure 1. Losses along the food chain
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of transportation infrastructure). Moreover, cultivated land is
diminishing fast, not just because of expanding deserts, but
also because much of it is being lost to urbanisation and
motorisation. The addition of some 75 million people every
year claims nearly 3 million hectares for housing, roads,
highways and parking lots. The main reasons why world
food supply is tightening are population growth and
accelerated urbanisation and motorisation1, changes in
lifestyles, falling water tables and diversion of irrigated
water towards the cities (The Earth Institute, 2005). All this
leads to losses in soil availability, quality and use for food
production.
By 2050, global food output must increase by about 70%
due to higher food demand, changing diets towards high
quality food, urbanisation and Motorisation. Urbanisation
will double domestic and industrial water use, not to mention
climate change and bioenergy production. Without water
productivity gains, crop water consumption will double by
2050 (Table 2). The water “bubble” is unsustainable and
fragile because 7 billion people at present have to share the
same quantity of water as the 300 million global inhabitants
of Roman times. About 80% of water for food production
comes directly from rain, but an increasing part is met by
irrigation (IWMI, 2007).
Both the physical water productivity (more crop per
drop) and economic water productivity (more value per
drop) have to be increased by investing in rainfed agriculture
and irrigation. Water productivity improvement is feasible,
but farmers optimise land productivity rather than returns to
water, particularly where water is subsidised. We do not
know what the adequate incentives are, but farmers in the EU
are fighting for a higher irrigation water subsidy without
impact analysis of water productivity improvement.
Promoting food trade from water rich, highly productive
areas to water scarce areas contributes to global water
productivity improvement.
To meet world demand the necessary production growth
will, to a large extent, have to be met by a rise in the
productivity of the land already being farmed today.
However, this will be difficult to accomplish as global
agricultural productivity growth has been in decline since the
Green Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. Global crop yield
increases have plummeted from 4% per annum in the 1960s
to 1980s to 2% in the 1990s, and, to barely 1% in 2000 to
2010 (FAO, 2008). Yield increases have generally exceeded
areal increases. While substantial expected yield increases in
India, the USA, Russia and Ukraine are expected in the
future, Europe’s role and share as supplier of food to the
world is diminishing. The net crop-trade position of the EU-
27 can be expected to deteriorate. The EU’s capacity to help
fight world starvation will be reduced at a time in which food
production will decline predominantly in those countries
which already have record increasing food import needs.
The sharp rise in prices of basic foodstuffs created
extreme difficulty for a large part of the world. Those who
have been most affected by the sharply rising food prices are
those who spend a larger share of their income on food. One
indication of it is the remarkable amount of civil unrest and
political instability that happened in 2008 and 2010 in dozens
of countries (Ethiopia, Egypt, Mexico, Thailand, Tunesia,
Lybia, Syria, etc.), as people were unable to afford basic
nutrition. There were also some extraordinary political
responses. Much of the world’s system of trade in foodstuffs
broke down temporarily as food exporting countries moved
to limit, or in some cases completely ban exports in an
attempt to provide some protection to their domestic
consumers (Krugman, 2009).
International trade in commodities futures has expanded
enormously; food and commodity prices went up very
sharply in 2008, and then fell significantly. Trading
commodity futures only affects the price to the extent that
speculation leads to withdrawal of real supplies, which leads
to hoarding. However, that was not the case with agricultural
commodities, as food stocks were at record lows at that time.
It is not correct that it was a speculative bubble. The rise and
fall of commodity prices affected not only commodities with
large futures, but those without such as iron ore or oil.
Trading commodity futures only affects the price to the
extent that speculation leads to withdrawal of real supplies,
which leads to hoarding. However, that was not the case with
agricultural commodities, as food stocks were at record lows
at that time. With an economic slump, the real price of
commodities always falls and vice versa. The great
depression showed a spectacular collapse of agricultural
prices. The fall in prices in 2008 was the consequences of a
global recession. With the end of crisis, resource constraints
plus bad policies has created a major problem for the supply
of food in the world. Aside from food prices being still on an
upward trend, price volatility is a clear problem. People do
not eat only in the long term, they eat every day. High prices
from 2008 re-occurred in 2010, which is a very serious
problem, as people are very vulnerable to such high prices.
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1An estimated 40 000 ha of land are needed for basic living space for every one million people added and 20 000 ha of land for every 1 million vehicles added.
Table 2. Water security
Source: IWMI (2007)
Water use Litres of water
Drinking water 2-5 litres per person per day
Household use 20-500 litres per person per day
Wheat 500-4 000 litres per kilo
Meat 5 000-15 000 litres per kilo
Biofuel 1 000-3 500 litres per litre
Cotton t-shirt 2 000-3 000 litres
Agriculture
3 000 litres per person per day
1 litre per calorie
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The poor have no access to ways of diversifying risk and
they have no protection against high food prices. What can
be done at this point? One thing is to invest in future food
production and this includes both physical and R&D. We
tend to think of agriculture as being an economics one on one
– market producers and consumers getting the market right.
This is true only up to a point. Agricultural production and
progress in production depends heavily on public goods,
especially R&D. There has been much less emphasis on this
research and physical infrastructure for agriculture in recent
years largely because people thought these problems were
solved. It looks like we have seriously underinvested and
need to play catch up (Krugman, 2009).
With the end of recession, we are back in a world that has
a growing population, growing purchasing power and a
growing consumption of foods heavily reliant on cereals for
their production. For example, meat uses a lot more basic
agricultural production than does the consumption of grain.
Water is a concern and so too is the use of potential arable
land. When arable land is diverted to non-agricultural uses, it
usually raises world GDP, but it also has the effect of
reducing the incomes of those already at the bottom of the
earning scale. We face a very serious outbreak of human
suffering and political instability resulting from a increasing
food price of food. There are no such mechanisms in place
yet to deal with these issues.
2. Energy security
Energy prices have seen a steady decline (in constant
dollars) over the last 200 years. The latest energy price hikes
have not even brought us back to the price levels of some
30 years ago. The tragic reality is that political zeal has led
governments to keep energy prices as low as possible, thus
frustrating most attempts to increase energy productivity.
Energy price elasticity is very much a long-term rather than a
short-term affair, yet the investments in infrastructure that
are crucial to the creation of an energy efficient society are
very long term. Creating a long-term trajectory of energy
prices that slowly, steadily and predictably rise in parallel
with our energy productivity would give a clear signal to
investors and infrastructure planners that energy efficiency
and productivity are going to become ever more necessary
and profitable (Krugman, 2009).
There is much debate about the potential contribution of
agriculture to renewable energies. The problem is that with
existing technology, renewable energies may be renewable,
but they are mostly not green. Whether second generation
biofuels can escape most of the pitfalls of the first generation
is open to doubt, although admittedly they do not use the
food component of plants.
Biofuels
Bioenergy covers approximately 13% of total world
energy supply. Traditional unprocessed biomass accounts for
most of this, but commercial bioenergy is assuming greater
importance. Liquid biofuels for transport are generating the
most attention and have seen a rapid expansion in
production. However, quantitatively their role is only
marginal; they cover 2% of total transport fuel consumption
and 0.5% of total energy consumption worldwide. Large-
scale production of biofuels implies large land requirements
for feedstock production. Liquid biofuels can therefore be
expected to displace fossil fuels for transport to only a very
limited extent. Even though liquid biofuels supply only a
small share of global energy needs, they still have the
potential to have a significant effect on global agriculture and
agricultural markets, because of the volume of feedstocks
and the relative land areas needed for their production.
The contribution of different biofuels to reducing fossil-
fuel consumption varies widely when the fossil energy used
as an input in their production is also taken into account. The
fossil energy balance of a biofuel depends on factors such as
feedstock characteristics, production location, agricultural
practices and the source of energy used for the conversion
process. Different biofuels also perform very differently in
terms of their contribution to reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. Second-generation biofuels currently under
development use lignocellulosic feedstocks such as wood,
tall grasses, and forestry and crop residues. This should
increase the quantitative potential for biofuel generation per
hectare of land, and could also improve the fossil energy and
greenhouse gas balances of biofuels. However, it is not
known when such technologies will enter production on a
significant commercial scale.
Liquid biofuels such as bioethanol and biodiesel compete
directly with petroleum-based petrol and diesel. Because
energy markets are large compared with agricultural
markets, energy prices will tend to drive the prices of
biofuels and their agricultural feedstocks. Biofuel feedstocks
also compete with other agricultural crops for productive
resources; therefore energy prices will tend to affect prices of
all agricultural commodities that rely on the same resource
base. For the same reason, producing biofuels from non-food
crops will not necessarily eliminate competition between
food and fuel. For certain technologies, the competitiveness
of biofuels will depend on the relative prices of agricultural
feedstocks and fossil fuels. The relationship will differ
among crops, countries, locations and technologies used in
biofuel production.
Biofuel development in developed countries has been
promoted and supported by governments through a wide
array of policy instruments; a growing number of developing
countries are also beginning to introduce policies to promote
biofuels. Common policy instruments include the mandated
blending of biofuels with petroleum-based fuels, and
subsidies. The exact contribution of expanding biofuel
demand to these price increases is difficult to quantify.
However, with increasing oil prices, biofuel demand will
continue to exercise upward pressure on agricultural prices.
Modern bioenergy represents a new source of demand for
farmers’ products. At the same time, it generates increasing
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competition for natural resources, notably land and water,
especially in the short run, although yield increases may
mitigate such competition in the longer run. Competition for
land becomes an issue especially when some of the crops
(e.g. maize, oil palm and soybean), that are currently
cultivated for food and feed, are redirected towards the
production of biofuels, or when food-oriented agricultural
land is converted to biofuel production. Biofuel policies have
significant implications for international markets, trade and
prices for biofuels and agricultural commodities. Current
trends in biofuel production, consumption and trade, as well
as the global outlook, are strongly influenced by existing
policies. Policies implemented in the EU and USA, which
promote biofuel production and consumption, while
protecting domestic producers especially in case of ethanol
production, typically exert much influence.
Trade policies vis-à-vis biofuels discriminate against
developing country producers of biofuel feedstocks, and
impede the emergence of biofuel processing and exporting
sectors in developing countries. Many current biofuel
policies distort biofuel and agricultural markets and
influence the location and development of the global
industry, such that production may not occur in the most
economically or environmentally suitable locations.
International policy disciplines for biofuels are needed to
prevent a repeat of the kind of global policy failure that exists
in the agriculture sector.
There are three traditional biofuels options: bioethanol,
biodiesel and biogas. Each differs in terms of feedstock
source, net energy yield per hectare and investment cost. The
net energy yield per hectare with biogas can be much higher
than with bioethanol production, provided the entire crop is
fermented in the biogas plant. However, bioethanol would
come closer to the net energy yield of biogas when cellulose
is fermented to alcohol. Additionally, the investment costs
are much higher for biogas than for bioethanol.
These differences explain why bioethanol is predo-
minantly produced in countries with an abundance of
agricultural areas, such as the USA or Brazil. The analysis of
ethanol production from maize in the USA is totally different
from that from sugarcane in Brazil due to the availability of
land, energy conversion rates and technologies used. In
more densely populated regions such as the EU, farmland is
more expensive. Therefore, the net energy yield per unit area
is more important and, thus, so is biogas production.
Additionally, the population density results in more waste
from food use and livestock production. The more expensive
the farmland – and the more waste and manure available –
the more attractive option biogas may become.
The main challenge of the biofuels industry in the coming
years is how to cope with relatively low fuel prices. The
longer-term outlook for fuel prices however remains bullish.
The question for the biodiesel sector will be – how many
companies will survive the hard times? An adjustment in
production capacity seems inevitable and manufacturers
which are part of conglomerates and/or are integrated in the
value chain usually have better chances of survival.
The economics of first generation biofuels are location
specific – as are environmental benefits. Both the USA and
the EU have many of the same players supporting and
resisting biofuels growth. The EU appears to be further ahead
in raising issues of sustainability, including mitigating the
threat to biodiversity, the effect on climate change, and
concerns related to food supply. However, these issues are
gaining attention on both sides of the Atlantic. The growth of
biofuels and the impending evolution to second-generation
biofuels present considerable challenges in terms of policy
development, trade and certification of sustainability.
Heretofore, these issues have been dealt with on a “local”
basis; but the time has come to take a global approach as well.
Is there any market relationship between the agriculture
of foodstuffs and that of energy? Is there available land?
Biofuels are not the primary driver affecting worldwide food
prices. However, the role of biofuels in food prices is
increasing. At present, feedstock for biofuel occupies just 1-
2% of global cropland. Rising population, changing diets and
demand for biofuels will increase demand for cropland. The
balance of evidence indicates there will be sufficient
appropriate land available to meet this demand to 2020, but
this must be confirmed before global supplies of biofuel
increase significantly. Current policies are not entirely
effective in assuring that additional production moves
exclusively to suitable areas – and attempts to do so will face
challenges in terms of implementation and enforcement.
Governments should amend but not abandon biofuel policy
in an effort to recognise these issues and ensure their policies
deliver net GHG benefits.
An increase in the use of grains for fuel ethanol occurred,
mainly due to a higher output in the USA and Europe. Net
use of grains for fuel ethanol is about 6%, as ethanol yields
dried distiller grains (DDGS) as by-product (F.O. Licht,
2011). The bulk of the worldwide use of grains in alcohol
production comprises maize in the USA and China. The
share of biodiesel in total vegoils use is around 11%. What
about the impact on use of agricultural land? In Brazil,
sugarcane is grown on 2.5% of the arable land and 1.5% of
arable land is dedicated to ethanol production. In the USA,
according to the Renewable Fuels Mandate, 136 billion litres
of biofuels will be needed by 2022 requiring feedstock
production on up to 15% of total arable land (own
calculation). In the EU, by 2020 the 10% of biofuel impact
on land use means that 15% of EU-27 total arable land will
be used for biofuel feedstock production (EC, 2009).
The development and evolution of trade rules regarding
biofuels is becoming a pivotal issue in both the EU and the
USA. Europe is questioning biofuel production on
agricultural lands. While the USA has more land, it does
appear that substantial farmland could be made available in
new EU Member States. Otherwise, biofuels will need to be
supplied by countries outside the EU. The existence of a
global market of food and biofuel requires the development
of expertise in building agribusiness systems that are
increasingly transnational and sustainable. This global
biofuel market will involve more production, compulsory
Policy challenges for food, energy and environmental security
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legislation and the standardisation and certification of the
ethanol itself. Market structure has been influenced by
policy, so strengthening the market is essential. Stakeholders
focus on their local markets first (the concept of “home
grown” is attractive) and international investment in biofuels
has been limited. Oil prices are largely demand driven, but
global recession has led to significant price falls. Investments
in alternative energy sources are risky in this environment
without policy measures that ensure against major drops in
oil prices. Policy is a key to promote sustainable biofuel
trade. At present, uncertain classification, a wide range of
government measures (tax incentives, tariffs, subsidies), and
a web of varying technical and environmental standards do
not facilitate trade.
It should be possible to establish a genuinely sustainable
biofuels industry, provided that robust, comprehensive and
mandatory sustainability standards are developed and
implemented. The risks of indirect effects can be
significantly reduced by ensuring that the production of
feedstock for second-generation biofuels takes place mainly
on idle and marginal land – and by encouraging technologies
that take best and appropriate advantage of wastes and
residues. Sustainable production is being increasingly
regarded as a prerequisite for market access. Sustainability
certification has three main dimensions: environmental,
economic and social. A schematic for certification must
overcome the difficulty inherent in measuring and verifying
what, in many cases, are aspirations or principles.
Certification requires an institutional environment with
requirements that can be effectively and consistently
implemented, and an organisational environment that
supports reliable monitoring and evaluation.
The main initiative for certification of biofuels has come
from national governments, private companies, non-
governmental organisations and international organisations.
Most are in the early stages, while other may come into force
in the near term. There is considerable variance in terms of
the principles they include and the procedures and
organisational processes involved. And most are based on
existing systems for the agriculture, forestry or energy
sectors. This certification system must cover all biomass
(regardless of the end use) and all relevant bioenergy – and it
must take a global approach as biomass and bioenergy
sources become internationally traded commodities. Systems
that focus simply on national or EU-wide implementation,
for example, will not help solve major sustainability issues.
Additionally, the system must take a holistic approach or risk
forfeiting all relevance. For example, if the relatively small
quantities of palm oil used for biodiesel production are
produced in a sustainable manner, but the large volumes
consumed in the food sector are not, all the effort expended
would be invalidated. As certification criteria are considered,
each country should prioritise the areas of law, production
and products, communications, distribution and logistics,
and human resources. Higher targets for biofuels in the
marketplace should be implemented carefully to ensure these
fuels are demonstrably sustainable. Any criterion related to
competition, or demanding more than just a reporting
obligation, could potentially lead to an infringement of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
Long-term strategy is needed to incorporate biofuels into
the energy supply chain. Fixed mandates can amplify price
volatility by drawing down stocks. Inflexibility caused by
mandates should be addressed: variable mandates would
contribute to protect consumers from shocks to food supplies
or changes in biofuels mandates and from shocks that
increase petroleum prices. A switch to second generation
feedstocks is a relatively inflexible commitment: diversion to
food is expensive. Biofuels production may increase even in
the absence of mandates at oil prices above USD100/barrel.
Removing trade distortions and investing in R&D of
advanced biofuels will contribute to reducing reliance on
fossil fuels without jeopardising food security. However,
improved regulation, functioning and transparency of food
and fuel policy is needed.
3. Environmental security
Biodiversity losses have accelerated, most notably in the
tropics. The depletion of fisheries and fish stocks has
continued, and in some cases has accelerated. China’s
growing appetite for mineral and energy resources in Africa
and elsewhere is cause for concern, and India, Brazil, South
Africa, Angola and others are all aiming to fuel their high
growth rates with accelerating resource extraction, and there
is no end in sight to this trend.
In terms of climate change and the overall ecological
situation, the picture is even grimmer. By adopting the right
policy mix, we can decouple wealth creation from energy
and material consumption just as we decoupled wealth
creation from the total number of hours of human labour.
That was the great achievement of the industrial revolution,
and labour productivity has risen at least twentyfold in the
course of mankind’s last 150 years of industrialisation.
Resource productivity should become the core of our next
industrial revolution. Technologically speaking, this should
not be more difficult than the rise in labour productivity.
We now start to recognise that the (over)exploitation of
our entire ecosystem and the depletion of natural resources
(the reserve/production ratio of oil reserves is rapidly
declining) must carry a price which must be paid today to
compensate future generations for the loss (or costs of
substitution) they will be faced with tomorrow. Moreover,
world population growth by 30% during the next 40 years,
causing new scarcities (e.g. water) and pollution (e.g. CO2
emission rights), is reinforcing this issue. Corporations in
energy-intensive sectors need to start taking future CO2
prices into account in their investment decisions and public
disclosure policies now. Because the scarcity of emission
rights has been recognised, an active market has been created
in the EU and CO2 emission rights now have a price; more
regional cap and trade markets for CO2 have been (in the
USA), or are in the process of being created.
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The EU has taken the political lead in addressing global
warming, setting up the European Trading System (ETS) for
CO2 emissions. The USA has given clear commitments to
mitigating global warming, and China too has become very
serious about tackling pollution, climate change and energy
efficiency. Renewable energy sources now constitute a
dynamic growth sector, and the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) is enjoying increasing visibility in the
signatory states which means nearly all countries around the
world except the USA.
The foundations for a new wave of growth based on the
technologies for a low carbon economy is of great
importance. The investments would drive growth over the
next two or three decades, ensuring it becomes sustainable.
Providing a strong, stable carbon price is the single policy
action that is likely to have the biggest effect in improving
economic efficiency and tackling the climate crisis. Lord
Stern calculated that governments should spend at least 20%
of their stimulus on green measures to achieve the emission
targets (Stern, 2006).
The environmental resource scarcity issues also still look
entirely real. Depending on the extent of climate changes,
many agricultural patterns may become disrupted, and the
poorest countries are the ones most vulnerable in the face of
this. In the long term, environmental security is the mirror
image of food security, because there is no food without
substantial clean water resources, productive soils, and
appropriate climate. In turn, failure to tackle environmental
degradation jeopardises the future of agriculture and the
countryside. Climate change puts all businesses and society
at cumulative, long-term risk. The failure of agriculture alone
would lead to widespread hunger in developing countries
and mass migration of people (half a billion according to the
UN), mostly to developed countries.
The search for more environmentally friendly
agricultural inputs and practices must continue. Scientists are
working to improve the efficiency of photosynthesis, carbon
capture, nitrogen fixation and many other cellular processes
that boost biomass yields. It may also become possible to
plant crops in soils lost to salinisation, and develop
genetically modified plants that can grow in marginal or
otherwise unusable farmland.
Mankind is directly influenced by the loss of biodiversity.
With the extinction of species we lose possibly crucial
opportunities and solutions to problems of our society.
Biodiversity provides us directly with essentials like clean
water and air, fertile soil, and protects us from floods and
avalanches. These aspects can all be economically valued. It
is a difficult and complex task, but through this valuation it
becomes clear how important they are for human well being
and economic development (Table 3).
Many people are unaware of the speed at which we are
using up our natural resources, and that we are producing
waste far faster than it can be recycled. It is important to
clarify the items of public goods and services with arguments
whether or not market failures are linked to the provision of
services. Market failure is a crucially important justification
for taking measures to protect our landscapes. Corrections in
market failures could also be achieved through investments
and the provision of payments to reward land managers who
provide public goods and services (EC, 2008).
It is important to demonstrate the economic value of
ecosystem goods and services. We not only need to know
costs, but also to be assured of the benefits. There is
increasing consensus about the importance of incorporating
these “ecosystem services” into resource management
decisions, but quantifying the levels and values of these
services has proven difficult.
Our research has revealed a disappointingly small set of
attempts to measure and value these services (Amstrong-
Brown et al. 2009). Chronologically the first is the
quantification of global ecosystem services by Constanza et
al. (1997). Estimates were extracted from the literature of
values based on willingness to pay for a hectare’s worth of
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Table 3. Scenario of the future: 2050
Source: Braat et al. (2008), Cost of Policy Inaction, OECD, COPI.
Actual 2000 2010 2050 Difference Difference Difference
Area million km2 million km2 million km2 2000 to 2010 2010 to 2050 2000 to 2050
Natural areas 65.5 62.8 58.0 -4% -8% -11%
Bare natural 3.3 3.1 3.0 -6% -4% -9%
Forest managed 4.2 4.4 7.0 5% 62% 70%
Extensive agriculture 5.0 4.5 3.0 -9% -33% -39%
Intensive agriculture 11.0 12.9 15.8 17% 23% 44%
Woody biofuels 0.1 0.1 0.5 35% 437% 626%
Cultivated grazing 19.1 20.3 20.8 6% 2% 9%
Artificial surfaces 0.2 0.2 0.2 0% 0% 0%
World Total 108.4 108.4 108.4 0% 0% 0%
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each of the services. These were all expressed in 1994 USD
per hectare and there was some attempt to adjust these values
across regions by purchasing power. The results were that
central estimate of the total value of annual global flows of
ecosystem services in the mid 1990s was USD 33 trillion (i.e.
1012) and the range was thought to be USD 16-54 trillion. To
put this figure into some kind of context, their central estimate
was 1.8 times bigger than global Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) at that time. We should take the figures only as the
roughest of approximations – indeed the authors warn of the
huge uncertainties involved inmaking calculations of this kind.
The “Stern Review” parallels “The Economics of
Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) study into the
economics of climate change (Stern, 2006). Climate change
could have very serious impacts on growth and development.
The costs of stabilising the climate are significant but
manageable; delay would be dangerous and much more
costly. The review estimates that if we do not act, the overall
costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing
at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. In
contrast, the costs of action – reducing greenhouse gas
emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change – can
be limited to around 1% of global GDP each year. Key to
understanding the conclusions is that as forests decline,
nature stops providing services which it used to provide
essentially for free. So the human economy either has to
provide them instead, perhaps through building reservoirs,
building facilities to sequester carbon dioxide, or farming
foods that were once naturally available.
The World Wildlife Fund’s “Living Planet” Report
demonstrates that mankind is living way beyond the capacity
of the environment to supply us with services and to absorb
our waste (WWF, 2008). They express this using the
concepts of ecological footprints and biocapacity, each
expressed per hectare per person2. Humanity’s footprint first
exceeded global biocapacity in 1980 and the overshoot has
been increasing ever since. In 2005 they calculated the global
footprint on average across the world was 2.7 global hectares
(gha) per person3 compared to a biocapacity they calculated
as 2.1 gha per person; a difference of 30%. That is, each
person on earth is on average consuming 30% more
resources and waste absorption capacity than the world can
provide. We are therefore destroying the earth’s capacity and
compromising future generations.
The study on TEEB is fundamentally about the struggle
to find the value of nature. There are about 100 000 terrestrial
protected areas on Earth, covering 11% of the land mass of
our planet. These protected areas provide ecosystem services
and biodiversity benefits to people valued at USD 4.4 trillion
to USD 5.2 trillion (i.e. million millions) per annum. As a
comparison, that is more than the revenues of the global car
manufacturing sector, steel sector and IT services sector
combined! Calculations show that the global economy is
losing more money from the disappearance of forests than
through the recent banking crisis, as forest decline could be
costing about 7% of global GDP. It puts the annual cost of
forest loss at between USD 2 trillion and USD 5 trillion. The
figure comes from adding the value of the various services
that forests perform, such as providing clean water and
absorbing carbon dioxide. But the cost falls dispro-
portionately on the poor because a greater part of their
livelihood depends directly on the forest, especially in
tropical regions. The greatest cost to western nations would
initially come through losing a natural absorber of the most
important greenhouse gas (EC, 2008).
The study shows that diversity is crucial for survival and
the importance of biodiversity for economic development. It
might be possible to substitute some of the ecosystem
services by human-made technologies, but the study results
clearly show that it is often cheaper to invest in the
conservation of biodiversity than to invest in new
technologies to substitute the services nature provides for us.
Therefore, it is essential for the safeguarding of our natural
resources to jointly create a co-ordination of economic
interests. We need to give the ecosystem services of
biodiversity a market value to create incentives for
developing countries to conserve their biodiversity.
Market-based instruments are helpful for giving the
peoples of the world a chance to secure the natural resources
and secure their livelihood simultaneously. In this context the
inclusion of the private sector into the process of
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity has high
priority. The goals of conservation and sustainability will
only be achieved if the main drivers of ecosystem and
biodiversity loss are actually addressed through appropriate
intervention and response based on credible valuations.
Businesses have to accept biodiversity as the indispensable
resource which it is and have to treat this resource with
respect and care.
The Global Canopy Programme’s report concludes: “If
we lose forests, we lose the fight against climate change”.
International demand has driven the intensive agriculture,
logging and ranching which have lead to deforestation.
Standing forest was not included in the original Kyoto
protocols and stands outside the carbon markets. The
inclusion of standing forests in internationally regulated
carbon markets could provide cash incentives to halt this
disastrous process. Marketing these ecosystem services
could provide the added value forests need and help dampen
the effects of industrial emissions. Those countries wise
enough to have kept their forests could find themselves the
owners of a new billion-dollar industry (Parker et al., 2008).
Currently, there are two paradigms for generating
ecosystem service assessments that are meant to influence
Nábrádi, András, Popp, József
2 The Ecological Footprint “measures the amount of biologically productive land and water area required to produce the resources an individual, population or
activity consumes and to absorb the waste it generates, given prevailing technology and resource management” (WWF, 2008).
3 A global hectare is a hectare with a global average ability to produce resources and absorb wastes.
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policy decisions. Under the first paradigm, researchers use
broad-scale assessments of multiple services to extrapolate a
few estimates of values, based on habitat types, to entire
regions or the entire planet (Costanza et al., 1997). This
“benefits transfer” approach incorrectly assumes that every
hectare of a given habitat type is of equal value – regardless
of its quality, rarity, spatial configuration, size, proximity to
population centres, or the prevailing social practices and
values. Furthermore, this approach does not allow for
analyses of service provision and changes in value under new
conditions. By contrast, under the second paradigm for
generating policy-relevant ecosystem service assessments,
researchers carefully model the production of a single
service in a small area with an “ecological production
function” – how provision of that service depends on local
ecological variables (Kaiser and Roumasset, 2002). These
methods lack both the scope (number of services) and scale
(geographic and temporal) to be relevant for most policy
questions (Nelson et al., 2009).
Spatially explicit values of services across landscapes
that might inform land-use and management decisions are
still lacking. Quantifying ecosystem services in a spatially
explicit manner, and analysing tradeoffs between them, can
help to make natural resource decisions more effective,
efficient, and defensible (Nelson et al., 2009). Both the costs
and the benefits of biodiversity-enhancing land-use measures
are subject to spatial variation, and the criterion of cost-
effectiveness calls for spatially heterogeneous compensation
payments (Drechsler and Waetzold, 2005). Cost-effec-
tiveness may also be achieved by paying compensation for
results rather than measures. We have to ensure that all
possibilities for creating markets to provide environmental
services are fully exploited to minimise the public costs (and
the extent of government bureaucracy etc).
Creating markets for environmental services could
encourage the adoption of farming practices that provide
cleaner air and water, and other conservation benefits.
Products expected to generate the greatest net returns are the
ones generally selected for production. Since environmental
services generally do not have markets, they have little or no
value when the farmer makes land-use or production
decisions. As a result, environmental services are under-
provided by farmers. The biggest reason that markets for
environmental services do not develop naturally is that the
services themselves have characteristics that defy ownership.
Once they are produced, people can “consume” them without
paying a price. Most consumers are unwilling to pay for a
good that they can obtain for free, so markets cannot
develop. Can anything be done other than relying on
government programmes to provide publicly funded
investments in environmental services?
Governments play a central role in creating markets for
environmental services, as has been done for markets in
water quality trading, carbon trading and wetland damage
mitigation. These markets would not exist without
government programmes that require regulated business
firms (such as industrial plants and land developers) to meet
strict environmental standards. In essence, legally binding
caps on emissions (water and carbon), or mandatory
replacement of lost biodiversity (wetland damage mitigation)
create the demand needed to support a market for
environmental services. So-called cap and trade programmes
create a tradable good related to an environmental service
(Ribaudo et al., 2008).
Mandatory reduction pledges can be experienced in all
developed nations apart from the USA. The same is true for
project-level reductions in developing countries. Mandatory
cap-and-trade programmes have been introduced in north
eastern USA and EU. The USA and Australian governments
announced that they will also institute a mandatory cap and
trade programme to create financial incentives to limit
energy use or reduce emissions.
In the case of water quality, it is necessary to establish
caps on total pollutant discharges from regulated firms in
some watersheds, and issue discharge allowances to each
firm specifying how much pollution the firm can legally
discharge. In markets for greenhouse gases, carbon credits
are exchanged. Contracts also include renewable energy
credits and voluntary carbon credits.
No-net-loss requirements for new housing and
commercial development require that damaged/lost wetland
services be replaced, creating demand for mitigation credits,
which are produced by creating new wetlands. In all of these
cases, the managing or regulatory entity defines the tradable
good and enforces the transactions.
Simply creating demand for an environmental service
does not guarantee that a market for services from
agricultural sources will actually develop. A number of
impediments affect agricultural producers’ ability to
participate in markets for environmental services. Purchasers
may be unwilling to enter into a contract with a farmer who
cannot guarantee delivery of the agreed-upon quantity of
pollution abatement, wetlands services, or other environ-
mental service. Some markets prevent uncertain services
from being sold. For example, the Chicago Climate
Exchange does not certify credits from soil types for which
scientific evidence is lacking on the soil’s ability to sequester
carbon. Transaction costs can also undermine the develop-
ment of markets for environmental services (Ribaudo et al.,
2008).
If markets are to become important tools for generating
resources for conservation on farms, government or other
organisations may have to help emerging markets overcome
uncertainty and transaction costs. Government can reduce
uncertainty by setting standards for environmental services
and can play a major role in reducing uncertainty by funding
research on the level of environmental services from
different conservation practices. For example, the
government can develop an online Nitrogen Trading Tool to
help farmers determine how many potential nitrogen credits
they can generate on their farms for sale in a water quality
trading programme.
While markets have many desirable properties, they are
limited in what they can accomplish, even with government
Policy challenges for food, energy and environmental security
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assistance. Public good characteristics that defy ownership
discourage markets for environmental services from
developing – and prevent the full value of environmental
services from being reflected in prices The prices of credits
in water, carbon, and wetland markets also may not reflect
their full social value, only their value to the regulated
community. A national cap-and-trade programme could
establish a national market for carbon credits. Others, such as
water quality trading or wetland damage/loss mitigation,
may be limited to a few specific geographic areas.
Enthusiasm can be observed for green public procure-
ment, linked to certification/labelling, and supported by due
information on embedded water/carbon/biodiversity or
simply guidance to help public procurers buy less
biodiversity harmful goods/commodities. It is a useful
stepping stone towards due biodiversity reflective
procurement in public sector establishments in due course
(schools, hospitals).
“Ecosystems” markets will change the present,
economics-only value-paradigm, with winners and losers.As
an example, countries and companies with significant
carbon-sink potential will benefit. On the other hand,
applying the “polluter pays” principle, CO2 emitters must
pay a price for continuing to be able to do so. The concept of
limiting (capping), auctioning and trading emission/
access/user rights must be further developed beyond CO2, in
scope (e.g. water) and scale (worldwide). On the basis of
valuing our ecosystems and regulating the access thereto, a
market will be created for payment for ecosystem-access
entitlements and for ecosystem services. We really need to
upgrade our performance metrics. The same is true with
respect to human/social capital: also here the metrics, the
value of education, culture, social cohesion, etc. should be
established and more prominently included in investment/
development decisions.
4. Conclusion
Limited land is available globally to grow crops for food
and fuel. There are direct and indirect pressures on forests
and other lands to be converted from growing food for
feedstock to be used for biofuel production. The balance of
evidence indicates there will probably be sufficient
appropriate land available to meet demands for both food and
fuel, but this needs to be confirmed before global supply of
biofuel is allowed to increase significantly. There is a future
for a sustainable biofuels industry, but feedstock production
must avoid encroaching on agricultural land that would
otherwise be used for food production. And while advanced
technologies offer significant potential for higher greenhouse
gas (GHG) savings through biofuels, these will be offset if
feedstock production uses existing agricultural land and
prevents land-use change. GHG savings can be achieved by
using feedstock grown mainly on marginal land or that does
not use land, such as wastes and residues (although this may
compete with other uses of these materials). To ensure that
biofuels deliver net GHG benefits, governments should
amend, but not abandon, their biofuel policies in recognition
of the dangers from indirect effects of land-use changes. Large
areas of uncertainty remain in the overall impacts and benefits
of biofuels. International action is needed in order to improve
data, models and controls, and to understand and to manage
effects. These challenges are aggravated by global
irresponsibility, regarding water and environmental sustaina-
bility. Finally, there is the challenge of who will pay for
agricultural public services provided by landmanagers that the
market does not pay for, such as rural landscape maintenance,
environmental protection, biodiversity and animal welfare.
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